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We use a lifecycle model in which individuals differ by age and by
wage in order to analyze a pairwise majority voting process on the
legal retirement age. We consider two different retirement regimes. In
the first one the retirees do not return to the labor market, regardless
the new retirement age. In the second one, they have to return if this
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age is higher than her own age. We show that the final outcome of the
voting process will crucially depend on the retirement regime as well
as on the parameters of the Social Security, that is, the redistributive
character of the system and the present legal retirement age.
1 Introduction
Reforms of Social Security systems is now one of the main issues of most of
industrialized countries’ economic policy agenda. It is widely considered that,
unless there are serious changes, the rise in the number of retirees relative to
workers will threat the viability of pay-as-you-go public pension systems in
the long-run. With the aim of eliminating these future financing problems,
the central reforms that are being proposed are raising taxes, cutting pension
benefits and/or raising the age of retirement, see Blondal and Scarpetta
(1998) or Gruber and Wise (1997).
In order to achieve this latter reform, the main economic policy measures
are either to allow a greater flexibility in Social Security’s retirement rules
(e.g. Germany, Italy or Sweden) or to postpone the pensionable age.1 In
point of fact, this second measure is one of the policy conclusions of Main-
taining Prosperity in an Ageing Society, OECD (1998): ”...a direct way to
encourage people to work longer would be to raise the pensionable age”.
However, according to recent surveys, most of workers declare that they
are happy with the current retirement age (see Cremer and Pestieau, 2003),
which suggests that reforms on the legal retirement age are becoming a deli-
cate matter for governments. In this paper we analyze this option, the reform
of the pensionable age. We concentrate on this specific issue by modeling a
pairwise majority voting process on the legal retirement age in a steady-
state setting with given discount rates and where the rest of Social Security
parameters are also given.
Earlier literature dealing with retirement in a political economy environ-
ment has mainly focussed only on the effects of Social Security systems on
1In Switzerland, for instance, in 1998 there was a referendum on a single issue, in which
the voters approved of a delay of two years in the female retirement age within the public
pension from 62 to 64 (Bütler, 2002).
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the individual retirement decision.2 Our paper examines the legal retirement
age, which allows us to emphasize the relevance of the indirect ’macro’ effects
of changing the pensionable age, that is, the effects on pension benefits via
the dependency ratio.
The term ’legal retirement age’ usually refers to the age at which bene-
fits are available. However, since there are strong incentives to stop working
after this standard entitlement age, in this model we consider the legal re-
tirement age as the age at which workers have to leave the labor force, that
is, as a mandatory retirement.3 Indeed, the average retirement age in some
OECD countries is very close to this standard retirement age (e.g. the United
Kingdom, Portugal or Ireland); see Blondal and Scarpetta (1998).4
Given that public pension systems often redistribute not only from younger
to older generations but also from high- to low-wage workers, we consider
that individuals differ by age and by wage. In such a context we study the
optimal legal retirement age of voters and obtain the elected one. We also
show that this majority equilibrium retirement age depends crucially on the
composition of the population as well as on the existing parameters of the
pension system.
Since individuals differ not only according to wage but also according to
age, population is divided into two completely separated groups: workers
and retirees. In order to see the relevance of the effects of pension reforms
on present retirees, we show how final results change depending on whether
retired people have to go back to labor market after the election or not. So,
we first assume that they will not return to the labor market, even although
the elected retirement age were higher than her own age. This implies that
they will behave as a homogeneous group and that, given that their pensions
are positively related to the retirement age via dependency ratio, they will
always prefer the highest one. We will also calculate the majority equilibrium
2See for instance, Sheshinski (1978), Crawford and Lilien (1981),Kahn (1988), or Fabel
(1994).
3In some countries there are direct restrictions on work above the standard age (Portu-
gal or Spain make entitlements to pension benefits beyond the standard age conditional on
complete withdrawal from work) or frequently, individuals have to leave their current jobs
to receive their pensions; see Blondal and Scarpetta (1998) or Gruber and Wise (1999).
4If there is a possibility to have an early access to pension benefits with some adjustment
in the value of retirement benefits, the average retirement age is usually found between
this age at which pensions can be accessed and the standard retirement age; see Blondal
and Scarpetta (1998) or Samwick (1998).
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when retirees have to return to work if the elected retirement age is higher
than her own age. Under this assumption retired people will no longer behave
as a homogeneous group which will affect to the final outcome of the voting
process.
The main findings of this study are the following. First, the older the
worker, the more difficult for her to change her retirement age. The reason is
the bigger weight of the wealth on the optimal retirement decisions as workers
get older and the link between the wealth and the status quo retirement
age. Second, workers with wages below average will delay their optimal legal
retirement ages as the Social Security system is more and more redistributive.
This result suggests that it may be appropriate to accompany the deferment
of the legal retirement age with an increase in the redistribution level of
pension system in order to ensure a bigger political support. Third, the
great importance not only of retirees but also of retirement conditions in
the final outcome of the voting process. This is highlighted by showing that
the relation between the redistribution level of the system and the elected
retirement age may be completely different depending on whether retirees
do or do not return to labor market. At last, it is worth noting a change in
the legal retirement age affect not only the worker’s decision, but also the
composition of the electorate, since it divides the population into workers and
retirees. So, although we prove that the workers’ preferred legal retirement
ages are positively related to the current one, it cannot be ruled out that,
under some circumstances, the macro effect of a lower current legal retirement
age be large enough to overcompensate the micro one and, therefore, imply
a higher elected one.
2 The model
Consider a constant population where individuals are continuously and uni-
formly distributed by age a with a ∈ [0, T ]. They are also continuously
distributed by wage, from a minimum to a maximum wage level, [wm, wM ].
Individuals know with certainty that they live for exactly T years, believing
that Rsq of which will be spent working and T −Rsq of which will be spent
in retirement, being Rsq the status quo legal retirement age.
Individuals have a stationary and temporally independent utility func-
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tion, separable and strictly increasing in consumption and leisure5. This
instantaneous utility function is written as u(ct) + v (lt) , where u(ct) is the
utility from consumption of goods ct at time t and v (lt) is the utility from
leisure lt, at time t. We assume that u is strictly concave for all ct. It is also as-
sumed that the coefficient of relative risk aversion ρr(x) = −xu00 (x) /u0 (x) is
non-increasing and smaller than one. The amount of hours labored while
working cannot be varied, it is institutionally set. We can, therefore, assume
that individuals have a fixed utility from leisure, v, independent of age. That




= v, where lwt and l
R
t indicate
hours of leisure while working and retired.
While working individuals earn a fixed gross wage per unit of time w ∈
[wm, wM ] independent of age. While retired they receive a constant stream
of pension benefits per unit of time p(Rsq;w).
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that savings earn no interest and
that individuals do not discount the future. Then, the lifetime utility of the
individual of wage w can therefore be written as
TZ
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Separability and concavity of the instantaneous utility function, certain
lifetimes, and perfect capital markets imply that each individual entering
the labor force, at age 0, will set a constant level of consumption in order to




(Rsqw (1− τ) + (T −Rsq) p(Rsq;w)) . (3)
The Social Security system is defined by a constant contribution rate τ ∈
[0, 1] and by a constant intra-generational redistribution degree α ∈ [0, 1] . It
is based on the Pay-As-You-Go principle. That is, pensions of retirees are
5Similar to Crawford and Lilien, (1981) or Sheshinski (1978) .
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financed by contributions of workers. Therefore, from the Social Security
budget constraint, we obtain the pension benefits per unit of time of the
individual with wage w
p(Rsq;w) =
Rsq
T −Rsq τ [(1− α) + αw] , (4)
whereRsq/ (T −Rsq) is the well-known dependency ratio and [(1− α) + αw]
a linear combination of the mean wage, , and the individual’s wage, w.
Thus, depending on the level of α, the type of Social Security may range
from a totally uniform pension benefits scheme (α = 0), usually referred as
Beveridgean, to a type in which pension benefits are actuarially fair (α = 1),
usually referred as Bismarckian.6
It is assumed that people face an unexpected voting process on the legal
retirement age at an arbitrary moment of time t > 0. In order to avoid
strategic behaviour, we assume that they cannot anticipate it and that the
elected retirement age is believed by everybody to remain indefinitely valid.
At the moment of the voting process each individual can be characterized
both by her age and by her wage. They will also have a different amount of
accumulated wealth, π(a,w) which is given by the total income earned minus













(w(1− τ)− p(Rsq;w)) a > Rsq.
(5)
This expression describes the pattern of wealth accumulation.
There exists a threshold wage w̃ such that w̃(1− τ) = p(w̃). In particular
w̃ =
Rsqτ (1− α)
(1− τ) (T −Rsq)−Rsqτα. (6)
For any w > w̃, wealth increases linearly with age up to the point in which
a = Rsq. In other words, they save money for retirement. Beyond that point
the agents start to spend their accumulated wealth until a = T , when wealth
is zero. For any w < w̃, wealth decreases linearly from a = 0 till a = Rsq.
6See Casamatta et al. (2000) for a classification of several OECD countries depending
on the redistribution character of the Social Security system.
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That is, the agents accumulate debt in a linear way. In other words, they
are borrowing against their pension wealth. From a = Rsq till a = T, wealth
increases (or debt decreases). Again, when a = T, wealth is zero.7
3 Preferred Legal Retirement Ages
Let us now analyze the preferred legal retirement age of the different agents,
the retirees, with a > Rsq, and the workers, with a 6 Rsq. Let R∗ (a, w) be
the optimal legal retirement age of an individual of age a and wage w.
3.1 The retirees
The indirect utility function of a retiree is
U (c, a) = (T − a) (u (c) + v) , (7)
where the constant consumption is
c =
1
T − a ((T − a) p(R;w) + π(a,w)) , (8)
being R the legal retirement age, p(R;w) her constant pension benefits per
unit of time, and π(a, w) her accumulated wealth.8
Given that the dependency ratio is increasing in R, pension benefits will
be positively related to the retirement age, and since retirees do not return
to the labor market, their utility functions will also be increasing in R.
Nevertheless, they will be indifferent between retirement ages within this
interval, R ∈ [Rsq + (T − a) , T ] . The reason is the following. Since retirees
will not come back to the labor force, an increase in the legal retirement
age will improve their pension benefits year by year as workers keep working
up to the new legal retirement age. So, retirees will be indifferent between
the retirement ages that have the same effect on their pension benefits, a
continuous increase until t = T .9
7So, if w < w̃ for any w ∈ [wm, wM ] , then the accumulated wealth is negative for all
values of a ∈ (0, T ).
8The formula of pension benefits of retirees is very extensive and not necessary for the
analysis. The only important thing is that it depends positively on the retirement age.
9For example, if Rsq = 60 and T = 80, a retiree with age a = 70 will be indifferent
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3.2 The workers
The indirect utility function of a worker is given by
U (R; a,w) =
 (T − a) (u (c) + v) R 6 a;
(T − a)u (c) + (T −R) v R > a.
(9)
It is easy to check that (9) is continuous for all R. The constant consumption




T−a ((T − a) p(R;w) + π(a,w)) R 6 a;
1
T−a ((R− a)w (1− τ) + (T −R) p(R;w) + π(a, w)) R > a;
(10)
and the constant pension benefits per unit of time is given by
p(R;w) =
R
T −Rτ [(1− α) + αw] , (11)
being R
T−R the new dependency ratio derived from the retirement age.
From (9), (10) and (11) the following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 1 Let a 6 Rsq. The utility function U (R; a, w) is single-peaked
in R. Moreover, R∗ (a, w) > a.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition tells us first, that any worker has an optimal legal re-
tirement age, and secondly, that a worker never prefers a legal retirement
age lower than her own age. In other words, voting for R∗ (a,w) < a is
always worse than voting for R∗ (a,w) = a, since both have the same effect
on leisure (the worker would be retired immediately after the election day
in both cases), but the first case implies lower pension benefits, due to the
dependency ratio effect on pensions.
The effect of the age and of the wage on the preferred legal retirement
age of a worker is characterized in the next proposition.
with reference to retirement ages comprised between (70, 80). If the new retirement were
R = 70, pension benefits would reach the stability after 10 years. This implies that
pension benefits would be increasing until this retiree were 80 years old, a = 80. But
pension benefits would also be increasing until a = 80 if R > 70.
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Proof. From the F.O.C. of the maximization problem of the utility func-






Rsq −R∗ (a, w)
T − a . (12)




= − [1− τ (1− α)] [u
0 (c) (1− ρr)]
(w (1− τ) + τW )2 u00 (c) 1
T−a
. (13)
This equation is strictly positive since the elasticity of marginal utility ρr is
less than one. Q.E.D.
The first point of proposition states that the older the worker, the closer
her optimal retirement age to that of the status quo. In other words, workers
with the same wage level have their optimal legal retirement ages monotoni-
cally ordered with respect to age toward the status quo retirement age, Rsq.10
The underlying economic intuition is as follows. Workers had planned their
consumptions regarding the previous retirement age, Rsq, and therefore, their
accumulated wealths will be closely related to the status quo situation. Be-
sides, since the absolute value of the accumulated wealth is strictly increasing
up toRsq, the weight of π(a, w) in the workers’ retirement decision raises with
the age. Consequently, the effect of the accumulated wealth, acting like a
magnet towards Rsq, implies that increases in the age takes R∗ (a, w) closer
to Rsq.
The second point says that optimal retirement ages are increasing with
wage. This result arises because the negative substitution effect on leisure of
a higher wage outweighs the positive income effect.11
10It has to be noticed that if a worker of wage w has her R∗ (a,w) lower than Rsq, then,
any other worker with the same wage but different age, ba, cannot have her R∗ (ba,w) higher
than Rsq.
11This result is similar to that obtained in the analysis of optimal individual retirement
decision of previous literature.
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It should be stressed that this proposition refers only to the cases in which
R∗ (a,w) > a. If R∗ (a,w) = a it would be possible that changes in wage
does not alter R∗ (a,w). The reason is the following. The utility function
(9) is continuous in all R but it is not derivable in R = a, so, there may be
individuals of the same age with the same optimal legal retirement age, her
own age, in spite of their different wages. This case, R∗ (a, w) = a, will be
more likely when workers are older. In other words, it is more probably that
old workers have the same optimal legal retirement age.12
4 Majority voting process
Let us now explain the pairwise majority voting process on the legal retire-
ment age.13 Since retirees do not return to the labor market, they vote for
the highest retirement proposal in order to improve their pension benefits
via dependency ratio.
In spite of some retirees are indifferent between the two retirement pro-
posals, we assume that they will always choose the highest one. Our reason is
the following. Retired people usually behave as an homogeneous group, and
since there will always be some retirees who will prefer the highest proposal,
those ones with ages slightly higher than Rsq, the rest of retirees will support
them. It is also considered that retired people are less than fifty per cent of
the population, which is the usual case in most of industrialized countries,
thus, decisive voters will belong to the working group.
With respect to the workers’ choice, let us begin with individuals who have
just entered to the labor market, that is, workers of age a = 0. Since π(0, w) =
0, their optimal legal retirement ages are independent of the previous status
quo one. Besides, given that R∗ (0, w) > 0 for any wage, these optimal ages
will be continuous and monotonically increasing distributed, from R∗ (0, wm)
to R∗ (0, wM).14
There exists a wage ŵ such that R∗ (0, ŵ) = Rsq.15 From now on, we
12Needless to say, for a same wage level, if R∗ (a,w) = a, increases in a leads to increases
in the optimal retirement age, R∗ (a,w), since R∗ (a,w) > a for any age.
13In such a process, Rsq does not have to be one of the two alternatives.





T−a , it can be derived that R
∗ (a, ŵ) = Rsq for any age
a.
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consider that ŵ ∈ [wm, wM ] . This implies that R∗ (a,w) < (>)Rsq for any
wage w < (>)ŵ, regardless the age.16 Optimal legal retirement ages of
working population are represented in figure 1.
As we can observe, differences between optimal retirement ages due to the
wage are smaller and smaller as workers gets older.
Summing up, since the utility function (9) is single-peaked with respect to
R, the majority voting process leads to a Condorcet winner legal retirement
age, Re, that divides the society into two groups of equal size. An illustrative
example can be observed in figure 2.
16If ŵ were higher (lower) than any w ∈ [wm, wM ], then all working population will
prefer a legal retirement age lower (higher) than the status quo one.
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Decisive voters are those with their R∗ (a,w) = Re. They form a contin-
uum of individuals and differ in terms of age. If Re ≷ Rsq, they also differ in
terms of wage.
If Re < Rsq, all workers from a given age, poor and rich old ones, would
prefer a retirement age higher than Re. On the contrary, in this case, poor
young workers will always prefer a greater advance in Re. Needless to say,
Re < Rsq implies that ŵ > wmed, being wmed the median wage.
If ŵ 6 wmed, the legal retirement age will be delayed, Re > Rsq.We should
note that although ŵ = wmed, that is, although 50% of working population
prefers a retirement age lower than Rsq, the elected one would be higher due
to the presence of retirees.17
Only if Re = Rsq, decisive voters would have the same wage, ŵ, and they
would only differ in age. In this case, those who prefer a legal retirement
age lower than Rsq, all workers with wages below ŵ, constitute half of the
population.18
17In a situation with a great number of retirees, it is possible that the delay in the
retirement age were so high, that the coalition in favor of a retirement age even higher
than Re were composed by young rich workers and retirees. In such a case, old rich
workers, together with all poor workers, would prefer a smaller postponement.
18The other half of population will prefer a retirement age higher than Rsq, and it will
be formed by those workers with wages above ŵ and the retirees.
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5 Comparative Statics
To see how Social Security parameters affect to the majority equilibrium
retirement age, let us now analyze how the decision of the working population
changes by altering the redistribution level of the system, determined by α
and τ , and the status quo retirement age Rsq.
5.1 The Redistributive Character of the Pension Sys-
tem
The next proposition states the effect of α and τ on the preferred legal
retirement age of workers.
Proposition 3 Let R∗ (a,w) > a. Consider a worker with a wage level w <
(w > ). The more redistributive the Social Security system, the higher
(lower) her preferred retirement age.
Proof. From F.O.C. of maximization problem (12), the implicit function




0 (c) (1− ρr (c))] τ (w − )







0 (c) (1− ρr (c))] (1− α) ( − w)
(w (1− τ) + τW )2 u00 (c) 1
T−a
. (15)
Since ρr (c) < 1, if w < (w > ) then ∂R
∗ (a, w) /∂α < 0 (> 0) and
∂R∗ (a,w) /∂τ > 0 (< 0) . Q.E.D.
An increase in the redistribution level of the pension system causes a
positive effect on the optimal decision of workers with w < , regardless the
redistributive parameter.19
A more redistributive system implies that public pension is more attrac-
tive for low-wage workers. So, they prefer to delay the legal retirement age
19Since the two discount factors are equal to zero and there is no borrowing constraints,
both redistributive parameters, α and τ , cause the same effect on the preferred legal
retirement age of workers.
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in order to increase the size of the Social Security system and to reduce their
private savings.
From this result we can deduce the following. If in a pension system
with a determined redistribution level, the half of population with optimal
retirement ages lower than Re in the voting process had all wages lower than
the mean one, then, for the same wage distribution and with the same status
quo retirement age Rsq, a more redistributive pension system would lead to
a higher Re.
This result contrasts with that obtained in models in which the pension
system allows for flexible retirement. In those cases, when the retirement
decision is analyzed, it is found that a more redistributive system reduces
optimal individual retirement ages. It is considered, first, that the pen-
sion system imposes a implicit tax on postponing retirement and secondly,
that this implicit tax is higher, the more redistributive is the system. (See
Casamatta et al, 2002)
Therefore, reforms of public pension systems aiming to raise the age of
retirement by increasing the flexibility in the retirement decision should be
implemented together with increases in the actuarial fairness of the system.
In this way, disincentives to work would be lower and therefore retirement
decisions of workers would be delayed.20
But, when the pension system reform is a postponement of the stan-
dard age of entitlement (as in New Zealand, Japan or Italy; see Blondal and
Scarpetta, 1998), our model suggests that, in order to increase the political
support, the reform should be accompanied by increases in the redistributive
character of the system, since it would reduce the rejection of the majority
of workers, those with wages lower than the mean one, by improving their
pension benefits.
5.2 The Status Quo Retirement Age
Let us now analyze the effect of Rsq on the retirement decision of workers.
Proposition 4 Let R∗ (a, w) > a. The higher the previous retirement age,
the higher the preferred one.
20A more actuarially fair pension system implies a closer relation between lifetime con-
tributions and pension benefits.
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Proof. We need to find out the sign of ∂R∗ (a,w) /∂Rsq. From F.O.C.





a (T − a)
T
(16)
Needless to say ∂R∗ (a,w) /∂Rsq > 0. Q.E.D.
A higher status quo retirement age implies a greater constant consump-
tion per unit of time previous to the voting process, and therefore a smaller
accumulated wealth for all workers with a > 0.21 Consequently, the negative
income effect on the leisure leads to a delay in the preferred legal retirement
age.
In spite of this result, it is not obvious that, given two identical pension
systems differentiated only by Rsq, the higher elected retirement age be as-
sociated with the higher status quo one. The reason is the different number
of retirees between the two economies. The influence of Rsq on the elected
one Re is stated in the following proposition.





i) If Re1 6 Rsq1 then Re1 < Re2.
ii) If Re1 > R
sq
1 , and R
∗
2(a, w) > R
e
1 for any age a ∈ [Rsq1 , Rsq2 ] and for any
wage w ∈ [wm, wM ], then Re1 < Re2.
Proof: See Appendix.
The first point of the proposition says that when the voting process does
not postpone the retirement age in the pension system with the lower Rsq,
this pension system will be related to a lower Re. The reason is that in both
systems individuals with ages between Rsq1 and R
sq
2 prefer a legal retirement
age higher than Re1 disregarding they are workers or retirees. So, the dif-
ference between the two voting outcomes arises due to the higher optimal
retirement ages of most of workers with ages from 0 to Rsq1 in the economy
with the higher status quo retirement age.22
21Either a smaller positive or a bigger negative accumulated wealth.
22We cannot guarantee that all workers from 0 to Rsq1 will have higher optimal retirement
ages in the economy 2 since the utility function is not derivable at R = a. As before, we
cannot rule out the possibility of workers with R∗(a,w) = a in both economies.
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The importance of retirees in the voting process is highlighted in the
second point of the proposition. If Re1 > R
sq
1 , we can only guarantee that
Re2 > R
e
1 under the conditions named in the proposition. In spite of most
of working population have a higher preferred legal retirement age in the
economy 2, it would be possible that the elected one were higher in the
economy 1. The reason is the different behaviour of those who change her
labor situation depending of the pension system they belong.
If Re1 were even higher than R
sq
2 , then individuals with ages between R
sq
1
and Rsq2 and wages between wm and ŵ2 would change her mind relative to
Re1 depending on they were workers or retirees. If they were in the economy
2, they would be workers and consequently they would be in favor of a legal
retirement lower than Re1, but if they were in economy 1, they would be
retired and therefore they would prefer a legal retirement age higher than
Re1.
The bigger percentage of retirees in the voting process in economy 1
prevents us to exclude the possibility that the economy with the lower status
quo retirement age be related to the higher elected one. This highlights
the crucial role of Rsq in the society. It does not only determine, at micro
level, the working period of an individual, but, at macro level, it also divides
population into workers and retirees, which may be decisive in most of public
choice issues. Given that retirees usually behave as a homogeneous group,
they will have a bigger or a smaller political power depending on her number.
6 Extension: Retirees Can Return to the La-
bor Market
So far, we had assumed that retirees did not return to the labor market. Let
us now analyze the implications that arise when they have to return to work
if the elected retirement age is higher than her own age. With this regime
the problem of the retirees is drastically changed.
The indirect utility function of a retiree is now given by (9), and the







(w(1− τ)− p(Rsq;w)) . (17)
Substituting (17) in (10) the following proposition is stated.
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Proposition 6 Let a > Rsq. i) The utility function U (R; a, w) is single-
peaked in R. Moreover, R∗ (a,w) > a.
ii) If R∗ (a, w) > a then ∂R∗ (a, w) /∂w > 0.
iii) Let R∗ (a,w) > a. If w(1 − τ) > (<)p(R;w), then ∂R∗ (a, w) /∂a >
(<)0.
Proof. See Appendix.
If retirees may go back to labor market, they will no longer prefer a
retirement age as high as possible. Now, her preferred age will depend on
her age and on her wage. In order to obtain higher pension benefits, her
preferred retirement age will be, at least, as high as her own age.23
The second and the third point of the proposition characterize the be-
haviour of retirees in the cases in which they want to return to work. As
in the working population case, optimal legal retirement ages are increas-
ing in wage. Again the positive substitution effect of a higher wage on the
retirement decision outweighs the negative income effect.
The proposition also tells us that, if the net wage is bigger (smaller) than
pension benefits, then, the older the retiree, the higher (lower) her optimal
retirement age, with the aim of reduce the period with the lower income per
unit of time.
On the other hand, it is easy to check that a recent retiree has the same
optimal retirement age as a worker of age Rsq.24 In other words, there is a
continuous distribution of optimal retirement ages from a = 0 to a = T. This
can be observed in figure 3, where an example with wM(1− τ) > p(R;wM)
is showed.
23Since retirees are older than workers, it will be more likely to find retired people with
optimal retirement ages equal to her own age.
24Since their accumulated wealths are equal.
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In order to compare the majority equilibrium under each retirement regime,
let Reh be the elected retirement age when retirees behave as an homogeneous
group, the former case, and Reb when retirees have to go back to work.
Proposition 7 i) If Reh 6 Rsq, then Reh = Reb. If Reh > Rsq then Reh > Reb.
ii) If Reh > R
∗ (a, ) for any a ∈ [0, Rsq] , R∗ (a, ) > Reb for any a ∈
[0, Rsq), R∗ (Rsq, ) = Reb and (1 − τ) = p(R; ), then, a higher intra-
generational redistribution level, lower α, will imply a lower Reh but a higher
Reb.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since retirees are older than Rsq, they will never prefer a retirement age
lower than Rsq. So, if the elected retirement age is lower than the status quo
one, the situation of retirees will not affect the voting outcome since in both
regimes they will prefer a legal retirement age higher than the elected one.
When the elected retirement age is higher than the previous one in the
two situations, since there will always be retirees in the back-to-work scheme
with optimal ages below the elected one, Reh will always be higher than R
e
b.
The second part of the proposition shows the importance of retirement
conditions on the final outcome of the voting process. It tells us that, under
some circumstances and if retirees may go back to work, a more redistributive
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pension systemwill imply a higher elected retirement age. On the other hand,
under the same circumstances, if retirees did not return to the labor market,
the more redistributive system would be related to a lower retirement age.
In other words, depending how pension reforms affect to present retirees, the
political support behind a delay in the retirement age could be completely
different.
At last, and with reference to the influence of Rsq on the elected one
Reb, we should note that it cannot be ruled out either the possibility that,
due to the different composition of retirees and workers in the population,
an economy with a lower Rsq may lead to a higher elected retirement age.
Although retirees may go back to work, there will again be voters that will
change her mind relative to the elected retirement age depending on they are
workers or retirees.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have employed a lifecycle model to study a majority voting
process on the legal retirement age. One result which emerges from our
analysis is that as workers get older, their preferred legal retirement ages
get closer to the present one, which suggests that a reform changing the
retirement age might come up against the opposition of the older workers.
It has also been suggested that in order to obtain a bigger political sup-
port, it would be better to combine different reforms. If the proposed reform
is to delay the pensionable age, it would be appropriate to associate it with
an increase in the redistributive character of the pension system, since it
would delay preferred legal retirement ages of the majority of workers by
improving their pension benefits. This result suggests that it will not always
be useful to strength the link between life-time contributions and pension
benefits, one of the main measures that is being proposed to encourage peo-
ple to work longer. It should only be applied together with reforms aimed to
increase the flexibility of the pension system’s retirement rules.
Finally, we want to emphasize another issue that runs through our results.
The crucial importance in the final outcome of any voting process of retirees
and, consequently, of the legal retirement age. Since this age divides popu-
lation into workers and retirees, and given that these latter usually behave
as an homogeneous group, political parties should take very into account
19




We can rewrite the indirect utility function (9) as
U (R; a,w) =









(T − a)u ¡ 1
T−a ((R− a)w (1− τ) +RτW + π(a,w))
¢
+ (T −R) v
R > a
(18)
where W = (1− α) + αw. The first and second derivatives of the utility





(T − a)u0 (c) τW T
(T−R)2 R 6 a

















00 (c) (w (1− τ) + τ ((1− α) + αw))2 R > a
(20)
From (19) and (20) we obtain that the function is strictly increasing with
respect to the retirement age for R 6 a, and it is strictly concave for R > a.
Therefore, preferences are single-peaked on retirement age and R∗ (a, w) > a
or to the right of his age, R∗ (a,w) > a. Q.E.D.
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8.0.2 Proposition 5
The following relations are used for proving the proposition: ∂R∗ (a,w) /∂w >
0, ∂R∗ (a,w) /∂Rsq > 0 and ∂R∗ (a,w) /∂a > (<)0 if R∗ < (>)Rsq for any
R∗ (a,w) > a.
i) We have to distinguish three situations:
- If Re1 = R
sq
1 . Then, R
∗
1 (a, ŵ) = R
e
1 for any age a ∈ [0, Re1) (recall
that ŵ is the wage such that R∗ (0, ŵ) = Rsq) and there exists an age â,
0 < â < Re1 such that R
∗
2 (â, ŵ) > R
e
1; there also exist two wages, w̆ and




2 (â, w̆) > R
e
1. Since
R∗2 (â, w̆) > R
e
1, we can find an age b̂, 0 < b̂ < â, such that R
∗
2(b̂, w̆) = R
e
1 and
R∗2(b̂, ŵ) > R
e
1. The population who prefer a legal retirement age lower than
Re1 with R
sq
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2(ĉ, wm) > R
e
1.
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e
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R∗1(b̂, w̆) < R
e
1. The population who prefer a legal retirement age lower than
Re1 with R
sq
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e
1. There exists a wage w̌, wm < w̌ < ŵ,
and an age â, 0 < â < Re1,such that R
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2(b̂, w̌) = R
e
1;
and therefore there exists an age ĉ, b̂ < ĉ < â, such that R∗1(ĉ, w̌) < R
e
1
and R∗2(ĉ, w̌) > R
e
1. There also exists a wage w̆, w̌ < w̆ < ŵ, such that
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w) < Re1. The population who
prefer a legal retirement age lower than Re1 with R
sq
1 are half of the total













ii) Since R∗2(a, w) > R
e
1 for any age a ∈ [Rsq1 , Rsq2 ] and for any wage
w ∈ [wm, wM ] , we only have to prove that the population who prefer a
legal retirement age lower than Re1 is reduced from a system with R
sq
1 to a
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e
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sq
1 ,
such that R∗2(â, wm) = R
e
1. The population who prefer a legal retirement
age lower than Re1 with R
sq
1 are half of the total population. Since for any









i) Equal to proof of Proposition 1.
ii) From the F.O.C. of the maximization problem of the utility function
(9), the implicit function theorem and after some simplifications we obtain
∂R∗ (a,w)
∂w
= − [1− τ (1− α)]u
0 (c) (1− ρr) + ϕ(a)
(w (1− τ) + τW )2 u00 (c) 1
T−a
(21)











a > Rsq. (21) is strictly positive given that ρr < 1 and ϕ(a) > 0.
iii) From the F.O.C. of the maximization problem of the utility function





(T −R∗ (a,w)) (w(1− τ)− p (w))
(T − a) (w(1− τ) + τW ) . (22)
If w(1 − τ) > (<)p (w) , then π(a,w) > (<)0, and ∂R∗ (a,w) /∂a > (<)0.
Q.E.D.
8.0.4 Proposition 7
Working population have the same optimal retirement ages under the two
retirement regimes. Therefore, the difference between the two elected retire-
ment ages will arise due to the different behaviour of retirees. So, in order
to distinguish this different behaviour, let R∗h(a,w) be the optimal legal re-
tirement age of retirees under the former regime, when they do not return
to the labor market and vote for the highest retirement age, and R∗b(a,w) be
the optimal age of retirees when they may have to go back to work.
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i) If Reh 6 Rsq. Retirees would have their optimal retirement ages above





If Reh > R
sq. Let w̆ > ŵ be the wage such that R∗ (Rsq, w̆) = Reh. If
w̆(1 − τ) 6 p(R; w̆), then ∂R∗b (a, w̆) /∂a 6 0. Consequently, for any age
a ∈ (Rsq, Reh] and for any wage w ∈ [wm, w̆), we get R∗b(a,w) < Reh and
R∗h(a,w) > R
e
h, which implies that in order to R
e
b divides population in two
groups of equal size, Reb < R
e
h. If w̆(1−τ) > p(R; w̆), we can find a wage ẇ ∈
[wm, w̆] and an age â, with Rsq < â 6 Reh, such that R∗ (â, ẇ) = Reh. Thus,
for any age a ∈ (Rsq, â) and for any wage w ∈ [wm, ẇ), we get R∗b(a,w) < Reh
and R∗h(a, w) > R
e
h, which implies that in order to R
e
b divides population in
two groups of equal size, Reb < R
e
h.
ii) The following relations are used for proving the second part of the
proposition: ∂R∗ (a,w) /∂w > 0, ∂R∗ (a,w) /∂α > 0 if w < (>) and
∂R∗ (a,w) /∂a > (<)0 if R∗ < (>)Rsq for any R∗ (a,w) > a. Let τ 1 = τ 2,
Rsq1 = R
sq
2 and α1 > α2.
First, we prove the positive relation between α and Reh. R
e
h1
> R∗1 (a, )
for any a ∈ [0, Rsq] implies the following. There exists a wage w̌ > and
an age â > 0, such that R∗1 (0, w̌) > R
e
h1,
R∗2 (0, w̌) = R
e
h1
and R∗1 (â, w̌) >
Reh1 .There also exist two wages w̆ and
...
w, with w̆ <
...
w < w̌, and an age b̂, with










The population who prefer a legal retirement age higher than Reh1 with α1
are half of the total population. Since for any age a ∈ [0, b̂) and for any wage
w ∈ [...w, w̌], we get R∗1(a,w) > Reh1 and R∗2(a, w) < Reh1, then Reh1 > Reh2 .
Now, we prove the negative relation between α and Reb. In this case,
we have to distinguish between workers and retirees. With reference to the
workers: R∗1 (a, ) > R
e
b1
for any a ∈ [0, Rsq) implies the following. There
exists a wage w̌ < and an age â > 0, such that R∗1 (0, w̌) = R
e
b1,
R∗2 (0, w̌) >
Reb1 and R
∗
2 (â, w̌) > Reb1 .There also exist two wages w̆ and
...
w, with w̆ <
...
w <








w) > Reb1 .




0 (c) (1− ρr) + φ(a)) τ (w − )









a−Rsqw (1− τ) T−a
T−Rsq
¢
. So, since (1−τ) = p(R; )






b (a, ) /∂α = 0, the percentage of retirees with optimal ages be-
low or equal to Reb1 will be those with age a ∈ (Rsq, Reb1] and wage w ∈
[wm, ] , regardless the intragenerational redistribution degree.
Summing up, the population who prefer a legal retirement age lower than
Reb1 with α1 are half of the total population. Since for any age a ∈ [0, b̂) and
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